Jayni Searle v. Boyd Searle : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Jayni Searle v. Boyd Searle : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christina Maria Santana; Gary Beaudry; Attorney for Apellee.
Jim C. Shirley; Laherty and Associates; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Searle v. Searle, No. 990726 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2315
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, ] 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 990726-CA 
) Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT, HONORABLE TIMOTHY HANSON PRESIDING 
o 0 o 
JIM C. SHIRLEY 
Laherty & Associates, P.C. 
10 E. Exchange Place, Suite £27 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -
Tel: (801) 534-0651 
Attorney for Appellant 
CHRISTINA MARIA SANTANA 
44 West Broadway, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellee 
GARY BEAUDRY 
322 Main Street, Suite 102 
Williston, North Dakota 58802-2141 
Attorney for the Fort Peck Tribes 
FILED 
SEP H 2000 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, ] 
Appellant, y 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 990726-CA 
) Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT, HONORABLE TIMOTHY HANSON PRESIDING 
OOO 
JIM C. SHIRLEY 
Laherty & Associates, P.C. 
10 E. Exchange Place, Suite 52 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -
Tel: (801) 534-0651 
Attorney for Appellant 
CHRISTINA MARIA SANTANA 
44 West Broadway, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellee 
GARY BEAUDRY 
322 Mam Street, Suite 102 
Williston, North Dakota 58802-2141 
Attorney for the Fort Peck Tribes 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS 3 
Overview: 3 
Background: 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
Method of Enforcement 8 
Due Process 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
A. FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT COMPLIANCE 9 
1. Alternatives to the Foreign Judgment Act . . . 10 
2. Compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act . . . . 11 
B. DUE PROCESS AFFORDED 12 
1. Validity 13 
A. Competent Jurisdiction 14 
B. Due Process 14 
(i) Invalidation Petition 15 
ii. Notice through the Juvenile Court's May 
15, 1998 Order 18 
iii. Standard for Ex Parte Type Orders . 19 
2. Finality 22 
A. Estate of Jones Standard of Finality . . . 22 
B. Finality as to the Issue of Custody . . . 23 
C. Laws of the State of Rendition 24 
CONCLUSION 24 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Case Law 
Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1991) 10 
Adoption of Hallowav. Matter of. 732 P.2d 962, 966 
(Utah 1986) 14 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 
1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) 20 
Estate of Jones, Matter of. 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993) . . . 13 
Holm v. Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157 , 163 (Utah App. 1992) . . . . 11 
Marquiles By and Through Marquiles v. Upchurch, 
696 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985) 2 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,490 U.S. 30, 
52, 109 S.Ct. 1507, 1610, 104 L.Ed. 2d 29, (1989) 14, 15 
Mullane v. Hanover Bank and Trust. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) 20 
Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45, 
50-51 (Tenn. 1993) 21, 22 
RUPP v. Grantsville Citv. 610 P.2d 338, 341, (Utah 1980) . . . 15 
Wiscombe v. Wiscombe. 744 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) . . 15 
RULES 
RULE 4 -501(3) (A) OF THE UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2 
Rule 5 of t h e Utah Ru les of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 12 
Rule 65A of Utah Ru les of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 20 
Rule 37 of t h e Utah Ru les of J u v e n i l e P r o c e d u r e 19 
ii 
STATUTES 
25 U . S . C . 1 9 1 4 9 
U . S . C o n s t . , Amend. 14 2 
U . S . C o n s t . , Amend. 5 2 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 3 0 - 6 - 4 . 2 & 4 . 3 19 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 2 a - l e t . seq. (1999) 2 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 7 8 - 2 2 a - 2 ( 2 ) (1999) 11 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 7 8 - 2 2 a - 3 (1999) 12 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 7 8 - 2 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) (1999) 12 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 7 8 - 2 2 a - 6 (1999) 10 
U t a h C o n s t . A r t . 1 , §24 2 
U t a h C o n s t . A r t . 1 , §7 2 
iii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, } 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 990726-CA 
i Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which cisnissed 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Assistance on a May 22, 193S 
Order from the Fort Peck Trial Court. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §"'?-
2a-3 (2) (a) (1999) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this case are: 
I. Did the trial court err in concluding that the Writ of 
Assistance did not comply with the Utah Foreign Judgment Ac;? 
This issue presents a question of law that does not require 
1 
deference to the trxal court. Marquiles By and Through Marquiles 
v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985). 
II. Did the Trial Court err when it determined that the Tribal 
Court's May 22, 1998 Order, which transferred custody, iackea aue 
process with respect to Appellee? This issue presents a question 
of law that does not require deference to the trial court. 
Marquiles By and Through Marquiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2a 1195, 
1199-1200 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Appellant believes the following statutes and constitut_onal 
provisions are determinative of this appeal. 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const., Amend. 5, 14 
Utah Const. Art. 1, §7 
Utah Const. Art. 1, §24. 
Statutory Provisions 
25 U.S.C. 1914 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 30-6-4.2 & 4.3 (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22a-l et. seq. (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-2(2) (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-3 (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-3(2) (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-6 (1999) 
2 
Rules of Procedure 
Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 65A of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS 
Overview: 
An Action was commenced on May 28, 1998 in the Third 
District Court (herein after "District Court") to enforce a May 
22, 1998 Order from the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal 
Court (herein after "Tribal Court") , the Honorable Judge Timothy-
Hanson presiding. The May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was 
entered after jurisdiction over an action was transferrec 
pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act by the Third District 
Juvenile Court (herein after "Juvenile Court"). 
Background: 
Appellee commenced suit in the Juvenile Court against 
Appellant in February of 1998, seeking termination of Appellant's 
parental rights. (See R. at 326-27). Appellant is the natural 
mother of Chad Searle ("Chad"). (See R. at 326). Appellees 
filed an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Custody in the Juvenile 
Court, prior to serving Appellant with the Petition to Terminate 
Appellant's Rights (herein "Termination Petition"). (See R. at 
326-27). On or about the 3rd day of March, 1999, the Juvenile 
3 
Court entered an ex parte Order granting temporary custoay of 
Chad to Appellee. (See R. at 326-27). 
On or about March 19, 1998, pursuant to the section 104 of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, a Petition to Invalidate and Vacare 
the Ex Parte Custody Order (herein after "Invalidation Petition"; 
was filed in the Third District Juvenile Court by Appellant. 
(See R. at 327). The Petition sought to vacate the March 3, 
1998 Juvenile Court Ex Parte Order of temporary custody. (See R. 
at 328). 
Appellant also filed a Petition to Transfer (herein after 
"Transfer Petition") the Juvenile Court matter to Tribal Court. 
(See R. at 327). In April of 1998, Appellee and Appellant 
agreed that the issues raised in the Invalidation Petition cc~ld 
be determined by the Court with jurisdiction after the Juvenile 
Court ruled on jurisdictional issues in the Transfer Petition. 
(See R. at 357 (paragraph 4)). The Juvenile Court, the Tribal 
Court, and the Fort Peck Tribes, were never notified of nor privy 
to this agreement between the Appellant and Appellle. (See R. at 
357 (paragraph 4)). Jurisdiction over the Juvenile Court action 
was transferred from the Juvenile Court to the Tribal Court 
pursuant to an order entered on May 15, 1998. (See R. at 6 & 
Addenda "A"). 
On May 22, 1999, the Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted 
jurisdiction and transferred placement of Chad to the reservation 
4 
and temporary custody to Appellant. (See R. at 9 & Addenda "B"). 
On or about May 28, 1998, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of 
Assistance in the District Court seeking to enforce the Tribal 
Court May 22, 1998 Order. (See R. at 1 & Addenda "C"). Attached 
to the Petition for Writ of Assistance was a certified copy of 
the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order granting Appellant temporary 
custody. (See R. at 9). The District Court scheduled and held a 
telephonic hearing on June 2, 1998, Judge Timothy Hanson 
presiding. (See R. at 11). Present telephonically at the 
hearing were: Appellant's counsel, Jim C. Shirley; and Appellee's 
counsel, Maria C. Santana. (See R. at 11). The Court indicated 
that it would issue the Writ of Assistance unless Appellee sought 
and obtained the assistance of another Court to stay the Writ of 
Assistance. (See R. at 11). 
On June 3, 1998, the Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson 
presiding, issued a stay of its May 15, 1998 order. (See R. at 
328). Appellant's counsel contacted the Third District Court and 
informed the Court Clerk that Appellant would not execute on ir_e 
Writ of Assistance pending a resolution of the Juvenile Court's 
June 3, 1998 Stay. (See R. at 55-56). 
On June 8, 1998, a telephonic hearing was held before ihe 
Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding. (See R. at 
328). Jointly with the Juvenile Court hearing, a telephonic 
hearing was also held before the Tribal Court, Judge A.T. Stafni 
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presiding. (See R. at 328). The hearings were telephonically 
held so that both Courts and all counsel could participate. 
Appellant's counsel and Appellee's counsel were both present ir. 
person at the Juvenile Court site. Gary Beaudry, counsel for the 
Tribes, was present at the Tribal Court site. (See R. at 211). 
Counsel were allowed to address both Courts. (See R. at 
211). Both Courts stated their respective positions. When it 
became clear that the Court's could not resolve their respective 
positions, the Juvenile Court stayed the May 15, 1998 order 
pending review by a "higher court." (See R. at 328). The Tribal 
Court also stayed its order pending review by a "higher court." 
(See R. at 328). 
Appellant filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief seeking 
review of the Juvenile Court's June 8, 1998 Stay (Case No. 
981352-CA). This Court vacated the Juvenile Court's Stay on 
September 1, 1998. (See R. at 110). The litigation resumed in 
the Fort Peck Tribal Court. On September 8, 1998, Appellant 
filed a Petition for Custody. (See R. at 329). The Petition 
for Custody was served upon Appellee's counsel pursuant to the 
Tribal Court's Rules of Civil Procedure (and Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure). (See R. at 329). On September, 9, 
1998, the Fort Peck Tribal Court dismissed the Petition for 
Termination of Parental Rights pursuant to Appellee's request and 
Appellant's stipulation (however the Tribal Court retained 
6 
jurisdiction over the custody matters pending before in 
Appellant's Petition for Sole Custody. (See R. at 329). 
On September 10, 1998, Appellant moved that the District 
Court issue a Writ of Assistance. (See R. at 55-56). Appellee 
filed a Notice of Appeal seeking review of the May 15, 1996 
Juvenile Court Order (which transferred jurisdiction).: (See R. 
at 68). On September 16, 1998, the District Court sent a letter 
to the parties stating that it would hold off decision pending 
the appeal filed by Appellee regarding the May 15, 1998 Juvenile 
Court Order transferring jurisdiction. (See R. at 55-56). 
On October 16, 1999, the Fort Peck Tribal Court granted a 
default judgment in favor of Appellant on her September 8, 1998 
Petition for Sole Custody. (See R. at 322-324). On November 
19, 1999, the Fort Peck Tribal Court held an Order to Show Cause 
hearing. (See R. at 326-333). Appellee failed to appear for the 
hearing after being served with notice to appear pursuant to the 
Tribal Court's Order. (See R. at 326-333). The Tribal Court 
held Appellee in contempt and ordered the child returned to the 
reservation in its November 23, 1998 Order on the Order tc Show 
Cause. (See R. at 326-333). 
On December 12, 1999, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal 
1
 Appellee also served a Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief against Judge Hanson of the District Court upon Appellant, 
but did not file the same or serve the Court with the same. 
(See R. at 55-56). 
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filed by Appellee regarding the Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998 
order. (See R. at 146). On December 18, 1999, Appellant 
requested issuance of a Writ by the District Court. (See R. at 
153-150). The Court scheduled a hearing on February 5, 1999. 
(See R. at 206). The hearing was rescheduled several times and 
was finally held on March 8, 1999. (See R. at 206-334). 
No evidence was taken. Only argument was offered. See 
Transcript. First, the Court found that the Petition for Writ of 
Assistance did not comply with the provisions of the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. (See Transcript at page 32 lines 19-20). The 
Court indicated that the sole method of enforcement was through 
the Foreign Judgment Act. (See Transcript at page 32 lines 3-5). 
Second, the Court found that the May 22, 1999 order coulc r.ot be 
enforced because the order lacked due process. (See Transcript 
at page 33 lines 4-8). The Court based this lack of due process 
finding on the fact that the order was issued Ex Parte on May 22, 
1998 (i.e. Appellee did not receive notice of the Fort Peck 
Tribes' Motion and, therefore, were not heard at the ex parte 
hearing) . (See Transcript at page 33 lines 4-8) . An oraer v;as 
entered on July 26, 1999 by the District Court on the March 13, 
1999 hearing. (See R at 453-57) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Method of Enforcement: The District Court ruled that zhe 
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only method of enforcement of a Foreign Judgment is through the 
process outlined under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. Contrary 
to the District Court's ruling, UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-6 (1999 
(entitled Optional Procedure) provides that the Foreign Judgment 
Act (Utah Code Anno. §78-22a-l et. seq. (1999)) does not "impair 
a judgment creditor's right to bring an action in this state to 
enforce" a foreign judgment. Appellant simply filed an action to 
enforce the custody order of a foreign jurisdiction as is 
provided for in the Foreign Judgment Act. Additionally, Appellee 
was provided all the procedural protections that are allowed 
under the Foreign Judgment Act. 
Due Process: The District Court ruled that the Tribal Court 
May 22, 1998 Order lacked due process in that Appellee was 
entitled to notice prior to the Tribal Court's decision. 
Contrary to the District Court's finding, Appellee was granted 
due process. First, Appellee had ample notice of the 
Invalidation Petition which requested that the March 3, 1998 Ex 
Parte Juvenile Court Order which granted temporary custody to 
Appellee be vacated. The Tribal Court had jurisdiction and a 
duty to immediately vacate the Juvenile Court's March 3, 1998 
Order. (See 25 U.S.C. 1914). 
Second, Appellee was afforded an opportunity for a hearing 
in which Appellee could contest the Order. On June 8, 1998, such 
a hearing was held. On June 8, 1998, the Tribal Court ever. 
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stayed its order, inviting a review by a "'Higher Court. The 
subsequent hearing complied with the general requirements for 
such an order (i.e. that any ex parte order must be followed by a 
hearing on the Motion that resulted in the order). Appellee's 
chose not to contest the Order through an appeal to the Tribal 
Court's Appellate Court or renew a fight for custody. 
Additionally, Appellee chose not to contest the subsequent 
custody action in Tribal Court, which resulted in a permanent 
custody order. Appellee had due process, but chose not to avail 
himself of the process provided. 
ARGUMENT 
A. FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT COMPLIANCE 
The District Court ruled that the only way to enforce a 
foreign judgment was through the Foreign Judgment Act. 
Additionally, the District Court Ruled that Appellant had failed 
to comply with the provisions of the Foreign Judgment Act. Both 
of these rulings are erroneous in that there are alternatives to 
the Foreign Judgment Acts provisions and Appellant substantially 
complied with the Foreign Judgment Acts' provisions. 
1. Alternatives to the Foreign Judgment Act 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-6 (1999) provides that "this chapter 
shall not be construed to impair a judgment creditor's right: to 
bring an action in this state to enforce such creditor's 
10 
judgment." "The judgment holder still has the option, however, 
to commence an enforcement action under the older, traditional 
approach." Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1143 (titan 
1991) . The traditional method of enforcing a judgment was re 
file an action on the judgment in Utah. Id. 
A Petition for Writ of Assistance is an action to enforce 
the provisions of a judgment in Utah. Under current case lav; and 
the statutory constructs of the Foreign Judgment Act, it seems 
clear that the Petition for Writ of Assistance should have beer, a 
viable alternative action to enforce the foreign judgment of rhe 
Tribal Court. The Writ of Assistance was an appropriate mezhoa 
in which to address the child custody issue which was involved in 
the enforcement of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order. 
2. Compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act 
Contrary to the District Court's Order of Dismissal, the Kay 
22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was domesticated in that an original 
certified copy was filed with the Clerk of the Court when the 
Petition for Writ of Assistance was filed. In Holm v. Smilowitz, 
840 P.2d 157 , 163 (Utah App. 1992), this Court noted: 
The specific langauge of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22a-2(2) 
(1992) reads: "A copy of the foreign judgment 
authenticated in accordance with an appropriat act of 
Congress...may be filed with the clerk of any district 
court in Utah. ... "The judgment holder still has the 
option to commence an enforcement action under the 
older, traditional approach." Footnote 2. 
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Clearly, Appellant had the option to enforce the action or 
to register the action in accordance with the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. Unlike the Smilowitz, Appellant filed an 
authenticated/certified copy of the Order with the Court. 
Thereby placing before the Court, an order which was 
registered/domesticated with the Court. 
While the District Court did not address exactly how 
Appellant failed to comply with the Foreign Judgment Act, i~ is 
clear that the relevant provisions were substantially complied 
with through alternative procedures. First, an original 
certified copy of the judgment was filed as required by UTAH CODB 
ANNO. §78-22a-2(2) (1999) ("A copy of a foreign judgment 
authenticated in accordance with an appropriate act of Congress 
or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any 
district court in Utah). (See R. at 8). The Tribal Court order 
was appropriately certified. (See R. at 8). 
Second, the Appellee was given notice that Appellant was 
seeking to enforce the judgment in Utah. While this notice did 
not take place in the method prescribed by UTAH CODE ANNO. §75-22a-
3 (1999), such notice was given when, in accordance with Rule 3 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellee's attorney was 
served with a copy Petition for Writ of Assistance with a copy of 
the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order attached. (See R. at 4). 
While an affidavit detailing the judgment debtors address was not 
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submitted as required by UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-3(2) (1999), a 
cover sheet was filed which detailed the judgment debtor's last 
known address. 
The procedural protections of the Foreign Judgment Act were 
met. As argued above, the Foreign Judgment Act was not the 
vehicle for enforcement. However, Appellee was given ail the 
procedural protections of the Foreign Judgment Act, in spite of 
the Appellant's exercise of the option to pursue an independent 
action to enforce the judgment. Accordingly, Appellee was not 
denied any process which was owed under the Foreign Judgment Act. 
B. DUE PROCESS AFFORDED 
The District Court also ruled that Appellee was not afforded 
Due Process in that the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was 
granted without notice to Appellee. This ruling was erroneous. 
In reviewing an order under the Foreign Judgment Act, the 
reviewing Court should look to see if the foreign judgment is 
valid and final. See Estate of Jones, Matter of, 858 P.2d 983, 
985 (Utah 1993) (If the judgment meets the validity and finality 
criteria, "it is entitled to full faith and credit"). While 
Estate of Jones dealt with the enforcement of the order under the 
Foreign Judgment Act, the analysis regarding the viability and 
enforceability of the foreign order should be basically the same 
for an enforcement action because the core issues are the same. 
Appellant would propose that the Court should use such an 
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analysis in reviewing the District Court's conclusion that the 
foreign order lacked due process. 
The District Court's order addressed only the validity-
portion of the analysis. However, since both prongs were raised 
and pled below, Appellant will address both the validity and 
finality issue as they relate to the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 
Order. As specifically set forth below, the Tribal Court's May 
22, 1998 Order is both valid and final. 
1. Validity 
"In order to be 'valid' for purposes of full faith and 
credit, a judgment must have been rendered by a court with 
competent jurisdiction." Estate of Jones, Matter of, 858 F.2d 
983, 985 (Utah 1993). If the rendering court had competent 
jurisdiction, the order must have been issued "in compliance with 
the constitutional requirements of due process." Estate cf 
Jones, Matter of, 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993). 
A. Competent Jurisdiction 
The original action involving Appellant's custodial rights 
was commenced in the Juvenile Court by Appellee. Pursuant to 
relevant provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, jurisdiction 
over the Juvenile Court matter was transferred to the Tribal 
Court. This issue was litigated to finality in the Utah Court 
System. Pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, the tribal 
court is the preferred forum for resolution of custody issues 
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involving "Indian" children. Adoption of Hallowav, Matter of, 
732 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
determination of the custody of an "Indian" child is "squarely" 
in the tribal court's hands. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
v. Holvfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52, 109 S.Ct. 1507, 1610, 104 L.Ed. 2d 
29, (1989). Based upon the transfer of jurisdiction under 
the Indian Child Welfare Act and the above-cited case law, ~he 
Tribal Court was a court of competent jurisdiction which had the 
authority to determine the custody issues involved. 
B. Due Process 
Based upon the fact that the Tribal Court was a "court of 
competent jurisdiction," the Court should look to see if the 
order passed constitutional muster. This Court has previously 
recoqnized that the demands of due process rest on the concept cf 
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to 
the case and just to the parties involved. Holm v. Smilowitz 840 
P.2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 744 
P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Rupp v. Grantsville 
City, 610 P.2d 338, 341, (Utah 1980)). "One of the fundamental 
requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard" 
and notice. Icl. Appellee's due process rights were not violated 
under Utah State Constitution or under the United States 
Constitution. 
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(i) Invalidation Petition 
Under Utah law that a judge may enter an order without a 
hearing where a party was served with a pleading and either fails 
to respond or fails to file a request for hearing.2 Rule 4-
501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
specifically provides that "a decision on a motion shall be 
rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the Court or 
requested by the parties." Rule 4-501(3) (F) also provides -hat a 
hearing shall be deemed waived if no written request for a 
hearing is made. Rule 55 allows the Court to enter judgment by 
default in cases where the responding party fails to respond 
within the time period allotted. 
Under these provisions, the Juvenile Court would have been 
well within its discretion to rule on the Issues in Appellant's 
Invalidation Petition at any time subsequent to the lapse of time 
for a Response because by failing to memorialize the April 
agreement or by failing to file a Response, Appellee waive his 
right to a hearing. Additionally, a ruling on Appellant's 
Invalidation Petition was mandated under Federal Law. See Section 
104 of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1914. Appellee's 
due process rights would not have been violated if the Juvenile 
Court had taken such an action. Appellee was served and had an 
2
 See Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration and Rule 55 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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opportunity to preserve his rights in relation to the Petition 10 
Invalidate. If the Juvenile Court had done so, Appellee would 
have been obligated to either file an appeal or move to vacate 
the order if Appellee wanted relief from such an order. 
While in April of 1998, Appellee and Appellant had agreed 
that a responsive pleading was needed only after the issue of 
jurisdiction was decided. The agreement was never communicated 
to the Juvenile Court or the Tribal Court by either party.3 The 
Juvenile Court and, subsequently, the Tribal Court were net bound 
by the un-memorialized agreement. 
The Juvenile Court could have disposed of the Invalidation 
Petition at any time. The Juvenile Court could have made a 
ruling either granting or denying the Motion without a hearing 
under Rule 4-501 or Rule 55. While the parties would be entitled 
to notice that the ruling had been issued, the parties were not 
entitled to notice that the Juvenile Court would be issuing a 
ruling because such Notice was provided when the pleading was 
served. 
If the Juvenile Court was entitled to dispose of the 
Petition to Invalidate as set forth above, the Tribal Court, upon 
3
 While the parties did agree on May 1, 1998, that the 
Juvenile Court should only consider the Transfer Petition prior 
to ruling on any other issues, the parties did not communicate 
that agreement was reached earlier in April with regard to the 
Invalidation Petition. The May 1, 1998 only addressed the 
Transfer Petition. 
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retaining jurisdiction, clearly acquired the same right. 
Accordingly, the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order did not lack 
due process in that Appellee waived any right to a hearing by-
failing to submit, at the very least, a written or oral request 
for hearing on the Invalidation Petition. The Tribal Court hac a 
duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, Section 104, to 
invalidate and vacate the Juvenile Court's March 3, 1998 Order 
because it was improperly entered. 
A subsequent order from the Tribal Court indicates that the 
Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order involved a decision to 
invalidate the Juvenile Court's March 3, 1998 Ex Parte Order. 
(See R. at 327-28). In the Tribal Court's November 23rd, 1998 
Order, the Tribal Court found: 
16. Ms. Searle filed a Petition to invalidate the 
improperly entered custody order, citing to 25 U.S.C. 
1914 and alleging violations of 1912(a, d,& e). 
17. Boyd and Dorthy Searle filed a Response to the 
Amended Petition to Transfer, alleging that domicile 
had not changed at the death of the emotional father 
and that Jayni Searle had abandoned the child, Chad 
Searle. 
18. Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law 
which demonstrated that under common law domicile did 
change at the death of a custodian to the surviving 
natural parent and which alleged grounds to demonstrate 
that Ms. Searle had not abandoned the child. 
19. On May 15th, 1998, the Third District Juvenile 
Court, in and for the state of Utah issued an order 
transferring jurisdiction to tribal court. 
20. On May 22nd, 1998, this Court found that it is has 
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exclusive jurisdiction and accepted jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous order 
granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle and ordered 
that the child be brought back to the reservation and 
placed in the custody of the natural mother. (See R. 
at 327-28). Emphasis added. 
The District Court had this evidence before it, but did net 
consider this evidence in making its ruling. This evidence was 
entitled to Full Faith and Credit. Rather than considering the 
evidence, the District Court did not look at the surrounding 
circumstances at the entry of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 
Order. The District Court limited itself to the May 22, 1998 
Order. (See Transcript Page 17 at 5-8). 
However, a full review of the facts before the Court, the 
Tribal Court's order did not lack due process because Appellee 
had notice of the Invalidation Petition and had an opportunity uo 
be heard on the issues raised therein. The subsequent orders 
should have been consider to place a context for the ruling and 
the facts which were before the Tribal Court. 
ii. Notice through the Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998 Order 
The Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998 Order also left the 
discretion over custody with the Tribal Court. (See R. at 6). 
The Order states as follows: 
1. The Verified Petition to Terminate Parental Rights 
of Jayni Searle is hereby transferred to the Tribal 
Court, as requested by the mother, for said Court's 
determination as to whether or not it wishes to 
exercise jurisdiction over this matter. 
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2. Pending such a determination by the Tribal Court, 
this Court directs that its Order of 3-3-98, placing 
temporary custody and guardianship of said child with 
the Petitioners, shall remain in full force and effect, 
and that said child remain in his current placement 
until the Tribe makes its determination. Emphasis 
added. (See R. at 6). 
The Tribal Court clearly had the discretion to change or 
modify the order in that there was no provision for its continued 
enforcement following acceptance of jurisdiction by the Tribal 
Court. Appellee was given notice that the Juvenile Court March 
3, 1998 Order only had full force and effect until the Tribal 
Court made its determination on jurisdiction. Appellee did 
nothing with this knowledge. 
iii. Standard for Ex Parte Type Orders 
There are several provisions which allow a Court to enter an 
Ex Parte Order. The Utah Cohabitant Abuse Act provides that the 
Court may issue an Ex Parte Order, but requires that a hearing be 
held within 20 days. See UTAH CODE ANNO. § 30-6-4.2 & 4.3. Rule 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides a 
similar 20 day hearing requirement in the issuance of a 
Protective Order. 
Rule 65A provides that a Court may issue a Temporary 
Restraining Order Ex Parte, subject to a hearing being held 
within 10 days. See Rule 65A of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(such an order is subject to stringent requirements regarding 
notice prior to its issuance). While these statutes/rules 
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present a formal process for authorizing the Ex Parte Order, they 
demonstrate that there are situations where the Court can issue 
an Ex Parte Order without violating due process. Taken as a 
whole, the statutes/rules allow an ex parte order where it is 
does not finalize the litigation and the opposing party has ar. 
opportunity to have a hearing on the matter subsequent to the 
order. 
Appellant does not dispute that a fundamental requirement cf 
due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard. See 
Mullane v. Hanover Bank and Trust, Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 
652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). However, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that "due process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 
L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). The question is whether the circumstances 
surrounding the entry of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order 
amount to due process. 
In the instant matter, the key points the District Court 
failed to look at in making its conclusions is that due process 
was afforded. While, ignoring the argument above regarding 
appropriate notice of the Invalidation Petition, Appellee did not 
have notice that the Tribal Court could enter an order accepting 
jurisdiction and changing custody, pursuant to the May 15, 1998 
Juvenile Court Order. Appellee did have a fair opportunity to 
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object and fight the issues raised by the order at the June 8, 
1998 hearing. 
On June 8, 1998, a hearing was held and Appellee was able tc 
present his arguments. The Tribal Court stayed the proceedings 
and its order pending a possible review by another Court cf the 
Stay issues. Appellee had the opportunity from June 8, 1998 
until October 1, 1998 to file an appeal, a Motion, or a request 
for some relief from the Court. Appellee could have requested 
relief from the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order. 
Despite all of Appellee's concerns regarding due process in 
Tribal Court, Appellee knew that the Juvenile Court's March 3, 
1998 Ex Parte Order clearly violated due process in that no 
notice was given to the mother and no hearing was ever held c:i 
the March 3, 1998 Ex Parte Order. Appellee knew that he did noi 
posses a valid order of custody. Appellee had nearly a four 
month window in which to file pleadings before the Tribal Court 
to seek custody. Appellee chose not to do so. Rather Appellee 
sat idly by. 
Appellee's claim of custody was defective and he knew or 
should have known it. Given the Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998 
Order extending the March 3, 1998 order only until the Tribal 
Court accepted jurisdiction and the defective nature of the March 
3, 1998 Juvenile Court Order, Appellee should have acted. In the 
subsequent proceedings, Appellee was given time to respond, but 
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chose not to do so. Appellee was given the opportunity to file 
Motions or Appeals to review the May 15, 1998 Order or obtain 
custody, Appellee chose not to do sol. Nothing precluded 
Appellee from seeking temporary custody through the Tribal Ccurt. 
Appellee was not denied any process, but rather denied himself of 
due process. 
Appellee was given sufficient due process subsequent to June 
8, 1998. In Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court held that while the initial notice to Phillips may-
have been defective, the hearings subsequent to the initial 
notice provided Phillips with sufficient Notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 863 S.W.2d 45, 50-51 (Tenn 1993). 
While Phillips involved an employee discharge, it provides a good 
factual analysis which the Court can look at. In the instant 
case, the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was subject to 
modification, it did not finalize the action. 
Appellee was afforded the opportunity to defend against the 
May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order in that the stay on June 8, 1998 
created a situation where the order did not effectively take 
effect for several months. Appellee had a choice to file 
pleadings, but chose not to do so. Rather, Appellee chose to sit 
on his rights. By the time that the District Court heard the 
matter, Appellee had over 9 months in which to have filed 
something contesting the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order. 
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Additionally, Appellee chose not to defend against Appellant's 
Petition for Sole Custody which was subsequently granted by tne 
Tribal Court on October 16, 1998. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the May 22, 1998 
Order lacked due process at the time it was issued, the 
subsequent proceedings in the case remedied any problems with the 
Order. Appellant was granted sole permanent custody on October 
16, 1998. Appellee could have contested the November 19, 1996 
Order to Show Cause, but chose not to appear. 
Appellee was given the opportunity to file pleadings 
repeatedly, but chose not to do so. Appellee was given 
procedural protections under the Tribal Court's Appellate Rules, 
but did not avail himself of those protections. By the time that 
the Court heard argument on March 10, 1999, Appellee had 
completely failed to participate in any meaningful way in Tribal 
Court, despite ample notice of the proceedings which were 
occurring. The District Court had evidence to show that any 
procedural defects that may have existed were cured by the 
subsequent proceedings which gave Appellant custody. The 
subsequent Orders demonstrate that the May 22, 1998 Order of 
Temporary Custody was appropriate despite Appellee's 
protestations that he was denied due process. 
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2. Finality 
A. Estate of Jones Standard of Finality 
The finality in the context of domestication of a foreign 
order is not the same as determining the finality of a judgment 
for purposes of appeal (i.e. interlocutory v. appeal of right). 
In the Estate of Jones decision cited above, the Court held that 
the foreign judgment (the California judgment) was "final because 
the trial court judgment was not appealed." Noting that the 
foreign jurisdiction (California) provided "a specific time 
period in which to appeal from the entry of judgment," the Court 
found that the litigant had failed to appear or participate in 
the foreign litigation, including a failure to even "attempt: to 
appeal the judgment." Id. at 98 6. 
This Court's interpretation is entirely consistent with the 
other provisions of the Foreign Judgment Act (the 30 day waiting 
period and the stay provisions which have been argued by 
Respondents previously). These provisions allow for time to file 
an appeal or to stay the enforcement if an appeal is pending. 
Under this analysis, the judgment is final in that Respondents 
failed to participate in the underlying litigation or challenge 
the tribal court's order in any manner (i.e. filing an objection 
or even a request for hearing). 
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B. Finality as to the Issue of Custody 
As shown by the subsequent Tribal Court Rulings en October 
16, 1998 and November 23, 1998, the issue of custody was 
finalized as of March 10, 1999. Whether the temporary custody 
order does not satisfy the requirement of finality is no longer 
an issue. Even if the temporary custody order was not final, it 
became final upon entry of the permanent custody Tribal Court 
Order on October 16, 1998. Even under Utah law, the temporary 
custody order could have been appealed subsequent to the 
determination of the custody action. The temporary custody order 
is now final and no longer subject to appeal. 
C. Laws of the State of Rendition 
The applicable provisions of the Fort Peck Tribal Couri: 
Rules of Appellate Procedure differ significantly from the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See R. at 200-05). Unlike the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, all appeals are labeled as 
being interlocutory. The orders which are appealable/final are 
those which "involves an issue of law consistent with a violation 
of due process adversely affecting the outcome of a trial on the 
merits, regardless of whether the final order includes a full 
determination on the merits." See Rule 6 of Fort Peck Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (See R. at 200-05). Therefore, the temporary 
custody order was final under the laws of the state of rendition 
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as required under the finality prong because Appellee could have 
appealed on an alleged due process violation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of the District Court should be either reversed 
or reversed and remanded. It should be reversed because tne 
District Court erred in determining that the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act precluded an independent action to enforce rhe 
judgment. It should be reversed because the order did not lack 
due process as established by the Tribal Court's subsequent 
orders, or, in the alternative, remanded so that the District 
Court can make a determination based upon all the evidence 
presented as to subsequent facts that were available at the time 
of the March 10, 1999 Hearing. The Order should not stand as ir 
was issued. 
DATED this j£ day of Szatewloz , 2000, 
l l a n t 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee. 
> Case No. 990726-CA 
) Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ADDENDA "A"-MAY 1 5 , 1998 
JUVENILE COURT ORDER 
A 
^ G3*?«£ 
In the Third District Juvenile Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
State of Utah, interest of 
Searle, Chad (1-14-97) 
A person under eighteen years 
| Ruling on Motions: 
Motion to Intervene 
Motion to Transfer to Tribe 
I Case #948405 
The above matter came before this Court pursuant to a 
Verified Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of Jayni 
Searle filed 2-23-98, and amended 3-19-98, filed by Petitioners, 
Boyd Clark Searle and Dorothy Searle. They were represented by 
Maria Cristina Santana, attorney- Subsequently, the above 
Motions were filed. The Motion to Intervene was granted to the 
Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes and signed by. this Court 
on 3-24-98, said Motion having been filed by Gary Beaudry, 
attorney for the Tribes. On behalf of the mother, Jayni Searle, 
Jim Shirley, attorney, filed a Motion to Transfer said matter to 
the Tribe. On 3-3-98, this Court issued an exparte temporary 
order of custody and guardianship with the Petitioners pending 
further hearing on their Petition for Termination. 
The Court, having reviewed the documents filed and the 
applicable sections of the Indian Child Welfare Reform Act, 
makes the following order: 
1. The Verified Petitibn to Terminate the Parental Rights 
of Jayni Searle is hereby transferred to the Tribal Court, as 
requested by the mother, for said Court's determination as to 
whether or not it wishes to exercise jurisdiction over this 
matter; 
2. Pending such determination by 
Court directs that its Order of 3-3-98, 
and guardianship of said child with the 
in full force and effect, and that said 
current placement until the Tri.be^ 'tiia'kes 
- ' " '
v
* " ^ day of^yV'19^8^ 
the Tribal Court, this 
placing temporary custody 
Petitioners, shall remain 
child remain in his 
its determination. 
Dated t h i s 1J 
STATE OF UTAH 
: U ' 
cc: 
019^ >A. JohknssoiV- Jxidg^ 
l( ) \'-y:<-'-'': 
.ay, attorney fob.mother 
/ 
Pirn Shir 
{aria Cris t ina"Santana, a t torney fo 
Jary Beaudry, a t torney for Tribes 
r Ifetf&pnei 
30UBT 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee. 
) Case No. 990726-CA 
) Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ADDENDA "B"-MAY 2 2 , 1998 
TRIBAL COURT ORDER 
A 
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
ASSINBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES 
FORT PECK INDIAN RESERVATION 
P.O. BOX 1027 
POPLAR, MONTANA 59255 
(406) 768-5557 
State of Utah, Third District Juvenile Court 
In the Matter of Chad Searle, 
A Minor Indian Child 
Order Accepting Jurisdiction 
(Utah case # 948405) 
Upon Motion of Gary M. Beaudry, ICWA Attorney for the Fort Peck Tribes and upon review 
of the court order issued by Judge Olof A. Johansson of the Third District Juvenile Court, Salt 
Lake City County, State Utah, in accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and good 
cause appearing this court issues the following: 
Findings 
1. This matter is an Indian Child Welfare Act Proceeding as defined under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978 as it pertains to a Termination of Parental Rights;. 
2. The child subject to this proceeding is an Indian Child as defined under the Act and the 
Fort Peck Tribes is the Indian Child's Tribe as defined under the Act; 
3. The State court after due process issued an order transfering jurisdiction of this matter 
to this Tribal court; 
4. This court enjoys jurisdiction exclusive of any state court under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a). 
NOWTHEREFORE it is the order of this court that: 
1. The Fort Peck Tribal Court hereby accept jurisdiction and allow the child to be transported 
from the State of Utah to the Fort Peck Indian Reservation by his Natural Mother, Jayni 
Searle and 
2. That the child shall remain under the temporary care, custody and control of his natural 
mother Jayni Searle until further order of this court. ^ , , 
Issued and dated this 22nd day of May 1998. . ' v - - ~~ / 
^Attest Clerk of Court Chief Judge, A.T. Stafiie 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee. y 
Case No. 990726-CA 
Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ADDENDA "C'-PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF ASSISTANCE 
B 
JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100) 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 8 1998 
( Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE 
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOYD SEARLE, 
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
ASSISTANCE 
Case No. 
Judge 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Jayni Searle, by and through counsel, Jim C. Shirley, and, 
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(d), petitions the Court to grant a Writ of Assistance in the above-
entitled matter. The Request is based upon the following: 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL RECITALS 
1. Jayni Searle is the natural mother of Chad Searle. 
2. An action was previously commenced in Third District Juvenile Court involving 
Chad Searle. 
3. Pursuant to a temporary order of custody signed on March 3,1998, Respondent, 
Boyd Searle, was given temporary custody, care, and control of Chad Searle. 
4. Respondent also obtained an Ex-Parte Protective Order from the Third District 
Court. 
5. The Ex-Parte Protective Order was certified to the Juvenile Court by 
Commissioner Arnett. 
6. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) (Indian Child Welfare Act), exclusive jurisdiction 
over the child and the proceedings was transferred to the Fort Peck Assiniboine 
and Sioux Tribal Court. See Exhibit #1 (Certified Copy of the Juvenile Court 
Order). 
7. The Fort Peck Tribal Court entered an order accepting jurisdiction, ordering that 
Chad Searle be transported to the Fort Peck Indian Reservation by Jayni Searle, 
and that temporary custody of Chad Searle be given to Jayni Searle. See Exhibit 
#2 (Certified Copy of Tribal Court Order). 
8. Based upon conversations between counsel for Boyd Searle and counsel for Jayni 
Searle, Boyd Searle has been unwilling to comply with the tribal court order and 
surrender custody of Chad Searle to Jayni Searle for transportation. 
9. To the best of Petitioner's understanding, Chad Searle attends Arcadia Elementary 
located at 3461 West 4850 South, Kearns, Utah 
10. To the best of Petitioner's knowledge, information, and belief, Chad Searle is 
either residing at: (1) the residence located at 4885 South 3640 West, Kearns, 
Utah; or (2) the residence located at 4906 South 4460 West, Kearns, Utah. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted "to promote the stability and security of Indian 
tribes and families." 25 U.S.C. 1902. The provisions of the Indian Child Welfare are controlling 
where applicable due to the supremacy of Federal Law. Adoption of Halloway. Matter of. 732, 
P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986). The importance of tribal primacy should be enforced by the state 
courts because the tribal interest in "preserving] its identity and the traditions" by determining 
"who will have the care and custody of its children." Id Under 25 U.S.C. 1911(d): 
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States, 
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, 
and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody 
proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to the 
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other public entity." 
CONCLUSION 
The Fort Peck Tribal Court has entered an order requiring the transport of Chad Searle to 
the tribal reservation by Jayni Searle. This order necessitates the surrender of physical custody of 
Chad Searle. Pursuant to federal law and the supremacy clause, the order of the Fort Peck Tribal 
Court should be given the same full faith and credit of any order granted by a court in the state of 
Utah. Third District Court should recognize and give full faith and credit to the Order of the Fort 
Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(d). The tribal court has 
determined that the temporary care, custody, and control of Chad Searle should vest in his 
mother and that Chad Searle should be transported back to the tribal reservation. The refusal of 
Boyd Searle to comply with this order is willful. The Court should issue a Writ of Assistance so 
that a peace officer or law enforcement officer may enforce the order of the tribal court and 
surrender the child to his mother so that he can be transported to the reservation. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court issue a Writ of Assistance directing the 
Sheriff, Law Enforcement, or Constable to use any and all necessary and reasonable means to 
secure the child and deliver him to Jayni Searle. All necessary and reasonable means shall 
include entrance upon the premises located at: (1) the residence at 4885 South 3640 West, 
Kearns, Utah; (2) the residence at 4906 South 4460 West, Kearns, Utah; or (3) Arcadia 
Elementary at 3461 West 4850 South, Kearns, Utah and execute upon the attached Order. 
DATED THIS P r^clay of jAm A , 1998. 
T 
JINVC. SHIRLEY 
Attorney for Jayni Searle 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this _ day of //la. A, 1998 I mailed, postage pre-paid First Class, 
a copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Assistance to: 
Maria Christina Santana 
Santana Law Firm 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Beaudry, Gary 
Beaudry Law Offices 
322 Main Street, Suite 102 
Williston, North Dakota 58802-2141 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee.
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Priority 4 
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ADDENDA "D"-COVERSHEET 
C 
COVER SHEET FOR CIVIL ACTIONS 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY) 
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
Name oauiM &«•&< 
Address rojrf Pick- Tfit^l /Ztsarutfbc.* 
Day Time Telephone <s 
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
Name 
Address 
ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
Name <J7n^> <C 54<rte^ 
Address^ UU^ fki , <>d± && 
SA(I- UU &U Oi*L fyM 
Day Time Telephone £fc>< 3S<? Soox 
ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER 
Name 
Address 
Day Time Telephone 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
N a m e T * ^ %or\^ 
Address tfioC So *&< H^CD U^S"T 
Day Time Telephone 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
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Day Time Telephone 
Day Time Telephone 
ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
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Address 2 / 5 9 £e*r£ ?co £«*rf 
£./<< 
Day Time Telephone 
A-4 6-/v u+*h 7^(04, Y 
ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
Name <£<<-^  '^c^Jt-, 
Addressj£ ^- JHx, ^  &+«** £ v ff* # 0 
Day Time Telephone 
TOTAL CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
$ _ 
JURY DEMAND 
D Yes J^T No 
SCHEDULE OF FEES: §21-5. CHECK ANY THAT APPLY. (SEE CASE TYPES FOR 
FILING FEES FOR COMPLAINTS OTHER THAN CLAIM FOR DAMAGES) 
a 
a 
a 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
Civil, Interpleader or Small 
Claims: $2000 or less 
Small Claims: $2001-$5000 
Civil or Interpleader: $2001-$9999 
$37 
$60 
$80 
a 
a 
a 
a 
Civil or Interpleader: $10,000 
and over 
Civil Unspecified 
-— MISCELLANEOUS — 
Jury Demand 
Vital Statistics §26-2-25 
$120 
$120 
$50 
$2 
COVER SHEET FOR CIVIL ACTIONS 
:ASETYPE (CHECK ONLY ONE CATEGORY) 
ie Case Type 
APPEALS 
120 D AA Administrative Agency Review 
70 D AP Small Claims Trial de Novo 
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120 Q BD Attorney Discipline 
;ch Q CV Civil Rights 
1120 Q CD Condemnation 
>ch Q CN Contract 
>ch D DC Debt Collection 
>50 D Expungement (Fee is $0 under 
circumstances of §77-18-10(2)) 
>ch D EV Forcible Entry and Detainer 
!120 D MI Forfeiture of Property 
Sch Q CV Interpleader 
Sch • LM Lien/Mortgage Foreclosure 
Sch D MP Malpractice 
5ch Q CV Miscellaneous Civil 
il20 D WR Extradordinary Relief 
Sch Q PI Personal Injury 
5120 D HC Post Conviction Relief: Capital 
5120 Q HC Post Conviction Relief: Noncapital 
Sch D PD Property Damage 
Sch D PR/QT Property /Quiet Title 
Sch D CV Sexual harassment 
Sch D SC Small Claims 
Sch D TP Tax 
Sch Q PR Water Rights 
Sch D WD Wrongful Death 
Sch Q CV Wrongful Termination 
—- DOMESTIC 
$0 D SA Cohabitant Abuse 
5120 D CV Common Law Marriage 
5120 Q CS Custody/Visitation/Support 
580 Q DA Divorce/Annulment 
Q Check if child support, custody or 
visitation will be part of decree 
N120 D PA Paternity 
580 Q SM Separate Maintenance 
t P f l n r S r n i f n r m Chi ld Cusforiv 
Fee 
$120 a 
$25 a 
$40 a 
$30 a 
$25 a 
$o a 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$120 • 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$120 a 
$o a 
$25 a 
$o a 
$o a 
$o a 
CS 
FJ 
AJ 
TL 
AJ 
AJ 
AD 
GC 
ES 
ES 
GC 
MH 
OT 
Case Type 
Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (UIFS A) 
- - TTTnr,FTVfTrMTQ JUUVjILlVIlldN l o 
Abstract of Foreign Judgment 
or Decree 
Abstract of Judgment or Order 
of Utah Court or Agency 
Abstract of Judgement or Order 
of Utah State Tax Commission 
Judgment by Confession 
Renew Judgment 
PROBATE 
Adoption 
Conservatorship 
Estate Personal Rep - Formal 
Estate Personal Rep - Informal 
Guardianship 
Involuntary Commitment 
Minor's Settlement 
NC Name Change 
OT Supervised Administration 
TR Trusts 
OT Unspecified Probate 
Cpirr'TAT TVyfATTT7TJC 
MI 
MI 
CRIM 
MI 
MH 
$0 D CRIM 
$25 T MI 
$0 a 
$25 a 
S25 3 
HL 
MI 
MI 
Administrative Search Warrant 
Arbitration Award 
Criminal Investigation Search 
Warrant 
Deposit of Will 
Determination of Competency in 
Criminal Case 
Extradition 
Foreign Probate or Child 
Custody Document 
Hospital Lien 
Judicial Approval of Document 
not part of a Pending Case 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 990726-CA 
1 Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ADDENDA "E"-OCTOBER 1 6 , 1998 
TRIBAL COURT ORDER 
D 
JAYNI SEARLE 
PROSE 
P.O. BOX 702 
WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59201 pl 
u LB i3 i n | ] 
! OCT'IBM Pj j 
FCKrPStS TRIBAL QDUSI 
V.'CIF ?C:NT. Mf ] 
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES 
In the Matter of Chad Searie, 
Minor Indian Child, 
Jayni Searie, 
Plaintiff. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW, AND DECREE 
) Case No. 517 
) 
) 
) Judge 
) 
'Sftfk 4 ^ ^ 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Jayni Searte's Petition for 
Restoration of Custody. An entry of, notice of, and application for default having been entered 
for Respondent's failure to answer the Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence 
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searie. The Court having reviewed the file and having 
made its decision, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Chad Searie is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to a ruling by 
Judge Stafne that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
2. Chad Searie is a native American child and a member or eligible for membership 
in the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes. 
3. Jayni Searie is a biological mother of Chad Searie. 
4. Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the Court to Jayni Searie on May 
22, 1998. 
5. The emotional father of Chad Searie died in February of 1998. 
6. Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searie have wrongfully maintained custody in 
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) and this 
Court's order or nrfay 22,1998. 
7. Boyd and Dorothy Searie are the emotional grandparents and currently have 
physical custody despite the Court's order. 
8. Boyd and Dorothy Searie have petitioned the court to dismiss the termination 
action pending in tribal court. See Attached exhibit #1. 
9. Jayni Searie is a person fit to assume custody on the afore-mentioned child. 
10. Jayni Searie and Chad Searie enjoy the relationship of mother and child. 
11. Jayni Searie and Chad Searie have a normal parent-child bond which has been 
drastically impacted by the emotional grandparents. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The matter is properly before the Court pursuant to tribal code. 
2. Jayni and Chad Searie are members or eligible for membership in the Fort Peck 
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes. 
3. Jayni Searie is domiciled on the reservation. 
4. Chad Searie, pursuant to law and tribal custom, became domiciled on the 
reservation due to the death of his physical custodian and emotional father, Boyd 
Carl Searie. 
5. Jayni Searie is a frt and appropriate person who should be awarded custody 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby 
iters the following: 
DECREE AND ORDER 
1. Chad Searie is hereby placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of 
Jayni Searie, his natural and biological mother. 
2. The previous order requinng transfer of Chad Searie to the reservation is hereby 
continued. 
Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove the child and return him to the 
reservation. 
SIGNED THIS \L oa,X¥rrtoP 1998. 
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On this f in day ofV V J .1998 I deposited in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Entry of Default to: Maria 
Santana, 2159 South 700 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
V . j 
Boyd Searle, ) 
Appellee. ] 
Case No. 990726-CA 
\ Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ADDENDA "F"-November 2 3 , 1998 
T r i b a l Court Order 
E 
JAYNI SfcAKLfc 
PROSE 
P.O. BOX 702 
WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59201 
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES 
In the Matter of Chad Searle, ) ORDER RE: ORDER TO SHOW 
A Minor Indian Child. ) CAUSE 
Jayni Searle, ) Case No. L^ I T" 
Plaintiff. ) Judge 5 r n v £ \ l FT 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on an Order to 
Show Cause on the 19tK Day of November, 1998. Present for the hearing was Jayni 
Searle. The Court notes that Boyd and Dorothy Searle were personally served with 
notice of the hearing and the Order to Show Cause by certified, return receipt, U.S. 
mail. The Court notes futher that counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina 
Santana, was served by certified, return receipt U.S. mail. The Court, having heard 
testimony from Jayni Searle and argument and having fully reviewed the file, enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Chad Searle is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
2. Jayni Searle is an Indian parent as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act 
3. Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation. 
4. Boyd Carl Searle was Chad Searle's emotional father, having been 
deemed so by his own admission in a divorce action in the Third District 
Court. 
5. On February 1998, Boyd Carl Searle died. 
6. Chad Searle was in the custody of his emotional father, Boyd Carl Searle, 
when the emotional father died. 
7. The emotional grandparents, Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Petition to 
Nil 231998 !>;; 
F0S7 P F T TRIBAL ^URT 
Terminate Poiental Rights of Jayni Searie in the . ..,rd District Court in 
Salt Lake County for the State of Utah. 
8. On March 3rd, 1998, Boyd and Dorothy Searie obtained temporary 
custody of Chad through order of the Third District Juvenile Court of 
Utah. 
9. Boyd and Dorothy Searie also filed a Petition for Protective Order. 
10. Subsequent to that order, Jayni Searie retained private counsel, Mr. Jim 
C. Shirley of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
11. Mr. Shirley obtained a copy of the March 3rtl, 1998 order. He 
subsequently received copies of the other documents. This transpired 
after the order of temporary custody was entered by the juvenile court. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searie did not sen/e Jayni Searie or the Fort Peck 
Tribes with Notice prior to obtaining the temporary custody order in 
juvenile court or the protective order in district court. 
12. The Petition for Protective Order was certified from Utah's Third District 
Court to Utah's Third District Juvenile Court. 
13. Mr. Shirley sent courtesy copies of the pleadings to Mr. Gary Beaudry, 
counsel for the Fort Peck Tribes. Prior to receipt of these courtesy copies, 
the tribe had not been notified of the proceedings as required by I.C.W.A. 
14. Ms. Searie filed a Petition to transfer the proceedings to tribal court under 
25 U.S.C. 1911(b) in the juvenile court, alleging concurrent jurisdiction. 
15. Ms. Searie subsequently filed an Amended Petition to transfer under 25 
U.S.C. 1911(a) in the juvenile court, alleging exclusive jurisdiction. 
16. Ms. Searie filed a Petition to invalidate the improperly entered custody 
oruei, wwi£ ^a u . o . u . i» i** emu ciiieyiuy viuua i^ ui o i ^ d t u , a e ; . 
17. Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Response to the Amended Petition to 
Transfer, alleging that domicile had not changed at the death of the 
emotional father and that Jayni Searle abandoned the child, Chad 
Searle. 
18. Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law which demonstrated 
that under common law domicile did change at the death of a custodian 
to the surviving natural parent and which alleged grounds to demonstrate 
that Ms. Searle had not abandoned the child. 
19. On May 15tk, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court, in and for the state 
of Utah issued an order transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court. 
20. On May 22n<L 1998, this Court found that it has exclusive jurisdiction and 
accepted jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous 
order granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle and ordered that the 
child be brought back to the reservation and placed in the temporary 
custody of the natural mother. 
21. On the 3A Day of June, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court entered 
an order staying its May 15tk, 1998 order. 
22. On June 8tkf 1998, the tribal and juvenile courts issues stays of the 
proceedings pending hearing before an appeals or federal court on the 
issue of whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to enter such 
an order. 
23. Ms. Searle caused to be filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals in and 
for Utah. 
24. On August 31st, 1998, counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle signed a 
voluntary dismissal of the Petition to Terminate. 
25. On the 1 st Day of September, 1998, the Court of Appeals found that the 
Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to enter any orders. 
26. On the 8tk Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Petition for Sole 
Custody. 
27. Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Santana, was served with 
this Petition for Sole Custody. 
28. On the 9tk Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Stipulation to 
Dismiss Action Brought by Boyd and Dorothy Searle. 
29. On the 9tL Day of September, 1998, the Court granted Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle's voluntary dismissal but specifically ordered that "the previous 
order of temporary custody entered by this Court on May 22nd, 1998, is 
hereby continued with Jayni Searle." 
30. Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with the stipulation and 
the order. 
31. Jayni Searle subsequently filed an Notice of Entry of Default, Entry of 
Default, and Application for Entry of Default. All these documents were 
served on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, 
by U.S. Mail. 
32. The Court entered a default and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Decree. The decree was served on counsel for Boyd and 
Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail. 
33. Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Corrected Notice of Entry of Default. 
Corrected Entry of Default, and Corrected Application for Entry of Default. 
All these doci jnts were served on counsel for D< and Dorothy 
Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. mail. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Chad Searle is an Indian Child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
2. The Court previously entered a finding and conclusion of exclusive 
jurisdiction under 25 U S.C. 1911 (a) based upon the fact that upon the 
death of the custodian/emotional father, domicile of Chad Searle became 
that of his mother pursuant to tribal custom and well-established common 
law The Court previously rejected Boyd and Dorothy Searle's con-
tentions as mentless. 
3 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues of custody and 
contempt before it The Indian Child Welfare Act applies to the case at 
hand Tribal court is the proper forum for any litigation involving the 
custody of an Indian child which is not the result of a divorce action or 
delinquency matter The Court obtained jurisdiction originally due to the 
transfer of the litigation involving the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights 
At the time the Petition to Terminate Parental Right was withdrawn, the 
Court retained jurisdiction due to a pending Petition for Sole Custody filed 
by Jayni Searle which was filed prior to the stipulation allowing dismissal 
The Court continues to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction The Court has 
original jurisdiction over the custody matter involving Chad Searle due to 
the filing of the Petition for Sole Custody Jurisdiction has never been 
terminated by the Court as contended by the emotional grandparents, 
soya and [ Jthy Searle. 
4. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Jayni Searle and Chad Searle as 
domiciliaries of the reservation pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
5. The court has personal jurisdiction over Boyd and Dorothy Searle that was 
acquired when litigation involving the termination of parental right action 
was transferred to Tribal Court. See 92 Corpus Juris Secundum, Venue 
SS 207 (the court receiving the transfer of jurisdiction/venue "thereby 
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter, all the parties 
thereto, and ail matters incident thereto, and it may inquire into 
matters connected with the subject matter of the action"). 
6. Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction due to emotional grandparents 
voluntary filing of pleadings before the Court. The Rules of Tribal Pro-
cedure require that the party file a special and limited appearance if they 
do not wish to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the tribal court. 
Boyd and Dorothy Searle failed to file any special and limited appearance 
as required. 
7. Jayni Searle having satisfied her burden by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that: 
a. Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with a true and correct 
copy of the Order to Show Cause; 
b. Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply 
with the Court's order to appear and produce the child; 
c. Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply 
with the Court's May 22nd, 1998 order to surrender physical 
custody of the child, and 
d. that Boyd and Dorothy Searle had the cap&w.»y to comply with the 
Court's orders. 
BASED upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are hereby held in contempt of Court; 
2. The Court will stay the jail time if and when Boyd and Dorothy Searle 
agree to bring Chad to the reservation as previously ordered; 
3. A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport 
of Boyd and Dorothy Searle to jail; 
4. The Court will lift the Bench Warrant if and when Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle contact the court, agree to return the child to the reservation, 
and make suitable arrangements for the transport of Chad Searle to 
the reservation; 
5. A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport 
of Chad Searle to the reservation; 
6. The court will lift the Bench Warrant upon Chad Searle's return to the 
custody of his mother; 
7. Boyd and Dorothy Searle be required to reimburse the tribe for costs 
incurred in the Fort Peck Tribe's effort to secure the release and return 
of Chad Searle to the reservation; 
8. The Fort Peck Tribes are ordered to provide the Court with a specific 
amount; 
9. Boyd and Dorothy Searle are ordered to pay Jayni Searle for 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred; and 
10. Jayni Searle is instructed to secure a list of attorneys fees 
incurred. 
DATED THIS A ^ D A Y OF /{Jh^V^ .
 1998. 
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 
JUDGE 
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On this_Qft__day of ) \ Q \ J . 1998 I deposited in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct signed copy of the foregoing Order Re: 
Order to Show Cause to: 
Maria Christina Santana 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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1 out of context. What the specific issue was was that the 
2 tribal court found exclusive jurisdiction. And Beaudry 
3 indicated that, as to that issue, there was due process in 
4 the state court. 
So I don't think he ever said that they had no 
right to due process in tribal court. And in fact, on — 
I've seen the tribal courts come into Utah from out of 
state to litigate matters. So I don't believe that he said 
that or that, if it was understood that way, that it was 
meant that way. 
So I believe like I've argued all the rest of the 
issues, and I'll just submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The record needs to clearly reflect 
that the Court's decision today goes to the order issued by 
the Ft. Peck Tribal Court dated May 22, 1998, a copy of 
which was attached to the original petition for writ of 
assistance. This action was commenced by the filing of a 
petition for writ of assistance and was not commenced in a 
fashion that generally would be handled in enforcing a 
foreign order, and that is through Section 78-22 (a)-1 in 
the following sections of the Utah Code Annotated, which 
specifically designated how one domesticates a foreign 
23 J udgment, 
24 
25 
The Ft. Peck trial order is clearly a foreign 
judgment, same as the State of Nevada or State of Colorado 
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1 or any place else. It's -- and to domesticate and, 
2 therefore, bring into power --or bring into play the 
3 powers of this Court to issue orders, one must follow the 
4 J foreign judgment act which provides for the domestication 
of those judgments. It's not difficult, one just has to 
6 I file the appropriate documents and give notice following 
7 the appropriate procedures outlined in that act. 
8 Once it's domesticated, then the -- then this 
g Court issues whatever orders are necessary in the same 
fashion as it would the domestication of any other foreign 
judgment, unless there's a showing that the foreign 
judgment was obtained without due process. 
With regard to the May 22, 1998 order, while 
there may have -- while Boyd Searle may have notice of the 
foreign judgment at this point in time and may have had an 
opportunity to -- this case has been in every court in the 
state except the federal court. Maybe we can get it over 
there too. 
But in any event, the Foreign Judgment Act has 
not been complied with as to the order of May 22, 1998. 
Even if it had been complied with, strictly complied with, 
and it must be, the only thing I've heard here and the only 
thing I can garner from this record is that the tribal 
court issued an order changing custody after it accepted 
jurisdiction, and that's fine, it likely has jurisdiction 
32 
T | in this matter. But it issued an order without giving 
2 I Mr. Searle any notice. And saying they fixed it after the 
3 fact doesn't rise to a level of due process 
4 He was entitled to an opportunity to have notice 
5 of the hearing that would be heard before an order was 
6 J issued on May 22, 1998, and he was not. That's the order 
7 [ that's sought to be enforced here, and I decline to do so 
8 I because it wasn't due process, 
g If this order had been issued by the State of 
Colorado, I wouldn't enforce it and for the same reasons, 
no notice. 
So as to the matter before me today, and that is 
whether or not a petition for writ of assistance will issue 
or should issue from this court, based upon the tribal 
court order of May 22, 1998, the petition is denied. 
Now, so we don't get down here in some other area 
with regard to a subsequent order that may have been issued 
10 
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18 with no t ice , l e t me make i t c lear what 's going to have to 
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happen in this case. 
This action, in its entirety, is dismissed 
because there has been no foreign judgment that has been 
properly domesticated in this case. 
Mr. Shirley, if you want to domesticate a foreign 
judgment beyond the one of May 22, 1998, you're going to 
have to follow 78-22 (a)-1 and domesticate whatever foreign 
33 
judgment you may have and with a proper pleading, in the 
first instance, giving Mr. Searle an opportunity to be 
heard. Assuming that the Court is satisfied that due 
process attaches to any subsequent order, then once that 
order -- once a foreign order is domesticated, then this 
Court, or wherever else you may file it, will issue the 
appropriate orders. 
But I am not going to issue, even if I was 
satisfied there were due process, an order for assistance 
based upon a subsequent filing following that original 
filing. It just -- you're just going to have to follow the 
Foreign Judgment Act before --at least before you get me 
to enforce it. Maybe you can convince one of my colleagues 
in this court to do so, but not me. 
So what I'm telling you is that, even though 
there may be some request on the part of the petitioner 
here, Jayni Searle, to have this Court consider a 
subsequent order following May 22, 1998 in tribal court, 
I'm not going to do it until that order is properly 
domesticated in the courts with 22(a) of Title 78. And 
that requires a new action. 
This case is dismissed in its entirety. 
Ms. Santana, prepare an appropriate order. 
MS. SANTANA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: With findings of fact that clearly 
34 
indicate that I'm satisfied the May 22, 1998 order has not 
been properly domesticated with the Foreign Judgment Act. 
And, number two, that the materials that have been 
presented to me here, both in oral argument and with the 
file, indicate that Mr. Searle was given no notice and no 
opportunity to be heard with regard to the orders that were 
issued by the tribal court on May 22 of 1998. 
And further, I want a further indication that 
because no order has --no foreign order has been 
domesticated, this action is dismissed in its entirety 
without prejudice, at least as to the subsequent -- the 
subsequent orders. 
Ms. Searle is entitled to domesticate the tribal 
court orders that came after May 22, 1998, if she does it 
properly. And if she files and domesticates a foreign 
judgment properly by filing an appropriate action with this 
court or this district, then we will deal with it in 
accordance with the law. But we're not going to do it 
backwards and then find ourselves in some appellate court 
two years from now having them saying, "What's Hanson doing 
issuing orders based upon a foreign judgment that was never 
properly domesticated?" We're going to do this right from 
the start. 
Prepare an appropriate order. 
MS. SANTANA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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1 (Whereupon, a t t h e hour of 11:45 a .m. , 
2 t he hea r ing was conc luded . ) 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jayni Searle, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Boyd Searle, ] 
Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 990726-CA 
Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ADDENDA " H " - D i s t r i c t Court 
Order o f D i s m i s s a l 
G 
.niFd Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE, : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD 
: CASE NO. 980905344 
JAYNI SEARLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOYD SEARLE, 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 8, 
1999 for hearing on petitioner's Petition for Writ of Assistance. 
Jim C. Shirley appeared representing petitioner, Jayni Searle. 
Maria Cristina Santana appeared representing respondent, Boyd 
Searle. Boyd Searle personally appeared. The parties have filed 
extensive pleadings regarding the issues before the Court, the 
parties made their respective arguments. The Court having reviewed 
the file, having properly considered all the oral and written 
arguments submitted to the Court by the parties, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
A A i r r\ 
SEARLE V, SEARLE PAGE TWO ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In February of 1998, respondent filed in the Third 
District Juvenile Court a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights 
of Jayni Searle in relation to Chad Searle. 
2. Subsequently, respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for 
Custody and obtained an Ex Parte Order of Temporary Custody on 
March 3, 1998. 
3. Petitioner filed a Petition to Transfer to Tribal Court 
in March of 1998. 
4. The Third District Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. 
Johansson, presiding, transferred jurisdiction over a pending 
Petition for Termination to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
5. The Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted jurisdiction and 
transferred custody of the minor child on May 22, 1998. 
6. Boyd Searle was not provided notice that the Fort Peck 
Tribal Court would issue an Order on the issue of custody. 
7. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with 
this Court seeking assistance of this Court in enforcing the May 
22, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order. 
SEARLE V. SEARLE PAGE THREE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
8. The parties have subsequently filed numerous pleadings 
regarding the appropriateness of the issuance of a Writ of 
Assistance. 
9. Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to give Full 
Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal Court Orders. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The May 22, 1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court 
transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign 
j udgment. 
2. As a foreign judgment, the judgment must be filed in 
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-22a-l, et seq. 
3. The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply with 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
4. Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior to 
the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court. 
5. The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be heard 
at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a violation 
of respondent's due process rights. 
n n 
SEARLE V. SEARLE PAGE FOUR ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
6. As such, the May 22, 1998 Order transferring custody is 
not entitled to full faith and credit. 
7. The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before the 
Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Petition for Writ of Assistance is denied. 
2. The action is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort 
Peck Tribal Court May 22, 1998 Order. 
3. The above-entitled action is dismissed without prejudice 
as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 22, 1998 Order which 
has been entered by the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the dismissal of 
this action in no way precludes subsequent enforcement of 
subsequent Orders through a filing under the/Jtah Foreign Judgment 
Act, and which are otherwise enforceable finder law^ 
Dated this .day of July, 1999./ * ^ ^l'v"» 
^LJMSJ) 
/TIMOTHY R. HANSQ^1^:^' i .-tr .VI' 
DISTRICT COURT JU! TIBCT" 
SEARLE V. SEARLE PAGE FIVE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order of Dismissal, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this ^ d a y of July, 1999: 
Jim C. Shirley 
Attorney for Petitioner 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Maria Cristina Santana 
Attorney for Respondent 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Gary Beaudry 
Attorney for Fort Peck Tribes 
322 Main Street, Suite 102 
Williston, North Dakota 58802-2141 
ft77l<fltfftrt. 
n n A nn 
